gnu: openssl: Update to 1.0.2j.
* gnu/packages/tls.scm (openssl): Update to 1.0.2j. [replacement]: Remove field [source]: Remove 'openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch' and 'openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch'. (openssl-1.0.2j): Remove variable. (openssl-next)[replacement]: Remove field. * gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch, gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch: Delete files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.master
Leo Famulari
parent
17b56c06e9
commit
1d8de185b8
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@ -725,8 +725,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
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%D%/packages/patches/openssl-runpath.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-c-rehash-in.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/openssl-c-rehash-in.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/orpheus-cast-errors-and-includes.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/ots-no-include-missing-file.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/p7zip-remove-unused-code.patch \
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@ -1,286 +0,0 @@
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Fix CVE-2016-2177.
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<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-2177>
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Source:
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<https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7>
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From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
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A common idiom in the codebase is:
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if (p + len > limit)
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{
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return; /* Too long */
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}
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Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
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limit == p + SIZE
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"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
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message).
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The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
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defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
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undefined behaviour.
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For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
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provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
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values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
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Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
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CVE-2016-2177
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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---
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ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++-------
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ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +-
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ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
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3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
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index ab28702..ab7f690 100644
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--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
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+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
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@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
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session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
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- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
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+ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
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al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
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goto f_err;
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@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
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/* get the session-id */
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j = *(p++);
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- if (p + j > d + n) {
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+ if ((d + n) - p < j) {
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al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
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goto f_err;
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@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
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/* cookie stuff */
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- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
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+ if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
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al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
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goto f_err;
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}
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cookie_len = *(p++);
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- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
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+ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
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al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
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goto f_err;
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@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
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}
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}
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- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
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+ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
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al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
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goto f_err;
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@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
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}
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/* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
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- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
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+ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
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/* not enough data */
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al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
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@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
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/* compression */
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i = *(p++);
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- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
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+ if ((d + n) - p < i) {
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/* not enough data */
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al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
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diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
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index b182998..54ee783 100644
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--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
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+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
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@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
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int r;
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#endif
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- if (session_id + len > limit) {
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+ if (limit - session_id < len) {
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fatal = 1;
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goto err;
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}
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diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
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index fb64607..cdac011 100644
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--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
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+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
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@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
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0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
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};
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- if (data >= (limit - 2))
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+ if (limit - data <= 2)
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return;
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data += 2;
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- if (data > (limit - 4))
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+ if (limit - data < 4)
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return;
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n2s(data, type);
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n2s(data, size);
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@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
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if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
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return;
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- if (data + size > limit)
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+ if (limit - data < size)
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return;
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data += size;
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@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
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const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
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const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
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- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
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+ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
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return;
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if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
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return;
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@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
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} else {
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const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
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- if (data + len != limit)
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+ if (limit - data != (int)(len))
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return;
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if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
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return;
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@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
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if (data == limit)
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goto ri_check;
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- if (data > (limit - 2))
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+ if (limit - data < 2)
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goto err;
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n2s(data, len);
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- if (data + len != limit)
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+ if (limit - data != len)
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goto err;
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- while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
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+ while (limit - data >= 4) {
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n2s(data, type);
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n2s(data, size);
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- if (data + size > (limit))
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+ if (limit - data < size)
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goto err;
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# if 0
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fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
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@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
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if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
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return 1;
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- if (data >= limit - 2)
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+ if (limit - data <= 2)
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return 1;
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n2s(data, len);
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- if (data > limit - len)
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+ if (limit - data < len)
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return 1;
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- while (data <= limit - 4) {
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+ while (limit - data >= 4) {
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n2s(data, type);
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n2s(data, size);
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- if (data + size > limit)
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+ if (limit - data < size)
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return 1;
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if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
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return 0;
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@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
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SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
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# endif
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- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
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+ if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
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goto ri_check;
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n2s(data, length);
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- if (data + length != d + n) {
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+ if ((d + n) - data != length) {
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*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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return 0;
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}
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- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
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+ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
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n2s(data, type);
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n2s(data, size);
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- if (data + size > (d + n))
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+ if ((d + n) - data < size)
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goto ri_check;
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if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
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@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
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/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
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i = *(p++);
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- p += i;
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- if (p >= limit)
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+
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+ if (limit - p <= i)
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return -1;
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+
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+ p += i;
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}
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/* Skip past cipher list */
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n2s(p, i);
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- p += i;
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- if (p >= limit)
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+ if (limit - p <= i)
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return -1;
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+ p += i;
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+
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/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
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i = *(p++);
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- p += i;
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- if (p > limit)
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+ if (limit - p < i)
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return -1;
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+ p += i;
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+
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/* Now at start of extensions */
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- if ((p + 2) >= limit)
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+ if (limit - p <= 2)
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return 0;
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n2s(p, i);
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- while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
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+ while (limit - p >= 4) {
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unsigned short type, size;
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n2s(p, type);
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n2s(p, size);
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- if (p + size > limit)
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+ if (limit - p < size)
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return 0;
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if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
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int r;
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--
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2.8.4
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@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
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Fix CVE-2016-2178.
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<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-2178>
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Source:
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<https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534>
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<https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=b7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b>
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From 621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida@aalto.fi>
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Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
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Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
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order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
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implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
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certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
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attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
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CVE-2016-2178
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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---
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crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 6 +++---
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
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index efc4f1b..b29eb4b 100644
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--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
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+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
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@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
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if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
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goto err;
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while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
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- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
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- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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- }
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if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
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if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
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@@ -279,9 +276,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
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}
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K = &kq;
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+
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+ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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} else {
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K = &k;
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}
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+
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DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
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dsa->method_mont_p);
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if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
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--
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2.8.4
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|
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From b7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2016 09:12:51 +0100
|
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Subject: [PATCH 2/2] More fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
|
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|
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The previous "fix" still left "k" exposed to constant time problems in
|
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the later BN_mod_inverse() call. Ensure both k and kq have the
|
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BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag set at the earliest opportunity after creation.
|
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|
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CVE-2016-2178
|
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|
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
|
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---
|
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crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 11 ++++++++---
|
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1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
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|
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diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
|
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index b29eb4b..58013a4 100644
|
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--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
|
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+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
|
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@@ -247,7 +247,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
|
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do
|
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if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
|
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goto err;
|
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- while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
|
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+ while (BN_is_zero(&k));
|
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+
|
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+ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
|
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+ BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
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+ }
|
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+
|
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|
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if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
|
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if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
|
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@@ -261,6 +266,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
|
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if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k))
|
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goto err;
|
||||
|
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+ BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
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+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
|
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* compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This
|
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@@ -276,8 +283,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
|
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}
|
||||
|
||||
K = &kq;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
K = &k;
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.8.4
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -214,8 +214,7 @@ required structures.")
|
|||
(define-public openssl
|
||||
(package
|
||||
(name "openssl")
|
||||
(replacement openssl-1.0.2j)
|
||||
(version "1.0.2h")
|
||||
(version "1.0.2j")
|
||||
(source (origin
|
||||
(method url-fetch)
|
||||
(uri (list (string-append "ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/"
|
||||
|
|
@ -225,11 +224,9 @@ required structures.")
|
|||
"/" name "-" version ".tar.gz")))
|
||||
(sha256
|
||||
(base32
|
||||
"06996ds1rk8xhnyb5y273a7xkcxhggp4bq1g02rab55d7bjhfh0x"))
|
||||
"0cf4ar97ijfc7mg35zdgpad6x8ivkdx9qii6mz35khi1ps9g5bz7"))
|
||||
(patches (search-patches "openssl-runpath.patch"
|
||||
"openssl-c-rehash-in.patch"
|
||||
"openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch"
|
||||
"openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch"))))
|
||||
"openssl-c-rehash-in.patch"))))
|
||||
(build-system gnu-build-system)
|
||||
(outputs '("out"
|
||||
"doc" ;1.5MiB of man3 pages
|
||||
|
|
@ -354,29 +351,10 @@ required structures.")
|
|||
(license license:openssl)
|
||||
(home-page "http://www.openssl.org/")))
|
||||
|
||||
(define openssl-1.0.2j
|
||||
(package
|
||||
(inherit openssl)
|
||||
(name "openssl")
|
||||
(version "1.0.2j")
|
||||
(source (origin
|
||||
(method url-fetch)
|
||||
(uri (list (string-append "ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/"
|
||||
name "-" version ".tar.gz")
|
||||
(string-append "ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/old/"
|
||||
(string-trim-right version char-set:letter)
|
||||
"/" name "-" version ".tar.gz")))
|
||||
(sha256
|
||||
(base32
|
||||
"0cf4ar97ijfc7mg35zdgpad6x8ivkdx9qii6mz35khi1ps9g5bz7"))
|
||||
(patches (search-patches "openssl-runpath.patch"
|
||||
"openssl-c-rehash-in.patch"))))))
|
||||
|
||||
(define-public openssl-next
|
||||
(package
|
||||
(inherit openssl)
|
||||
(name "openssl")
|
||||
(replacement #f)
|
||||
(version "1.1.0b")
|
||||
(source (origin
|
||||
(method url-fetch)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Reference in New Issue