Fixes CVE-2017-14859, CVE-2017-14860, CVE-2017-14862 and CVE-2017-14864. * gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch, gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14860.patch: New files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Register them. * gnu/packages/image.scm (exiv2)[source]: Use them.
		
			
				
	
	
		
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| Fix CVE-2017-14860.
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| 
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| https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14860
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| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14860
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| 
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| Copied from upstream:
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| 
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| https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/ff18fec24b119579df26fd2ebb8bb012cde102ce
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| 
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| From ff18fec24b119579df26fd2ebb8bb012cde102ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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| From: =?UTF-8?q?Dan=20=C4=8Cerm=C3=A1k?= <dan.cermak@cgc-instruments.com>
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| Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2017 23:09:08 +0200
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| Subject: [PATCH] Fix for CVE-2017-14860
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| 
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| A heap buffer overflow could occur in memcpy when icc.size_ is larger
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| than data.size_ - pad, as then memcpy would read out of bounds of data.
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| 
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| This commit adds a sanity check to iccLength (= icc.size_): if it is
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| larger than data.size_ - pad (i.e. an overflow would be caused) an
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| exception is thrown.
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| 
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| This fixes #71.
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| ---
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|  src/jp2image.cpp | 9 +++++++--
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|  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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| 
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| diff --git a/src/jp2image.cpp b/src/jp2image.cpp
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| index 747145cf..748d39b5 100644
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| --- a/src/jp2image.cpp
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| +++ b/src/jp2image.cpp
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| @@ -269,10 +269,15 @@ namespace Exiv2
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|                              std::cout << "Exiv2::Jp2Image::readMetadata: "
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|                                       << "Color data found" << std::endl;
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|  #endif
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| -                            long pad = 3 ; // 3 padding bytes 2 0 0
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| +                            const long pad = 3 ; // 3 padding bytes 2 0 0
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|                              DataBuf data(subBox.length+8);
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|                              io_->read(data.pData_,data.size_);
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| -                            long    iccLength = getULong(data.pData_+pad, bigEndian);
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| +                            const long    iccLength = getULong(data.pData_+pad, bigEndian);
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| +                            // subtracting pad from data.size_ is safe:
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| +                            // size_ is at least 8 and pad = 3
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| +                            if (iccLength > data.size_ - pad) {
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| +                                throw Error(58);
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| +			    }
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|                              DataBuf icc(iccLength);
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|                              ::memcpy(icc.pData_,data.pData_+pad,icc.size_);
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|  #ifdef DEBUG
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