* gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch, gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15119.patch: New files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add them. * gnu/packages/virtualization.scm (qemu)[source]: Use them.
		
			
				
	
	
		
			58 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			2.1 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Diff
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			58 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			2.1 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Diff
		
	
	
	
	
	
| Fix CVE-2017-15118:
 | |
| 
 | |
| https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-15118
 | |
| https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1516922
 | |
| 
 | |
| Patch copied from upstream source repository:
 | |
| 
 | |
| https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=51ae4f8455c9e32c54770c4ebc25bf86a8128183
 | |
| 
 | |
| From 51ae4f8455c9e32c54770c4ebc25bf86a8128183 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 | |
| From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
 | |
| Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2017 15:07:22 -0600
 | |
| Subject: [PATCH] nbd/server: CVE-2017-15118 Stack smash on large export name
 | |
| 
 | |
| Introduced in commit f37708f6b8 (2.10).  The NBD spec says a client
 | |
| can request export names up to 4096 bytes in length, even though
 | |
| they should not expect success on names longer than 256.  However,
 | |
| qemu hard-codes the limit of 256, and fails to filter out a client
 | |
| that probes for a longer name; the result is a stack smash that can
 | |
| potentially give an attacker arbitrary control over the qemu
 | |
| process.
 | |
| 
 | |
| The smash can be easily demonstrated with this client:
 | |
| $ qemu-io f raw nbd://localhost:10809/$(printf %3000d 1 | tr ' ' a)
 | |
| 
 | |
| If the qemu NBD server binary (whether the standalone qemu-nbd, or
 | |
| the builtin server of QMP nbd-server-start) was compiled with
 | |
| -fstack-protector-strong, the ability to exploit the stack smash
 | |
| into arbitrary execution is a lot more difficult (but still
 | |
| theoretically possible to a determined attacker, perhaps in
 | |
| combination with other CVEs).  Still, crashing a running qemu (and
 | |
| losing the VM) is bad enough, even if the attacker did not obtain
 | |
| full execution control.
 | |
| 
 | |
| CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
 | |
| Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
 | |
| ---
 | |
|  nbd/server.c | 4 ++++
 | |
|  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
 | |
| 
 | |
| diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
 | |
| index a81801e3bc..92c0fdd03b 100644
 | |
| --- a/nbd/server.c
 | |
| +++ b/nbd/server.c
 | |
| @@ -386,6 +386,10 @@ static int nbd_negotiate_handle_info(NBDClient *client, uint32_t length,
 | |
|          msg = "name length is incorrect";
 | |
|          goto invalid;
 | |
|      }
 | |
| +    if (namelen >= sizeof(name)) {
 | |
| +        msg = "name too long for qemu";
 | |
| +        goto invalid;
 | |
| +    }
 | |
|      if (nbd_read(client->ioc, name, namelen, errp) < 0) {
 | |
|          return -EIO;
 | |
|      }
 | |
| -- 
 | |
| 2.15.0
 | |
| 
 |